The Theory of Search Games and Rendezvous (Paperback, Softcover reprint of the original 1st ed. 2003)

,
Search Theory is one of the original disciplines within the field of Operations Research. It deals with the problem faced by a Searcher who wishes to minimize the time required to find a hidden object, or "target. " The Searcher chooses a path in the "search space" and finds the target when he is sufficiently close to it. Traditionally, the target is assumed to have no motives of its own regarding when it is found; it is simply stationary and hidden according to a known distribution (e. g. , oil), or its motion is determined stochastically by known rules (e. g. , a fox in a forest). The problems dealt with in this book assume, on the contrary, that the "target" is an independent player of equal status to the Searcher, who cares about when he is found. We consider two possible motives of the target, and divide the book accordingly. Book I considers the zero-sum game that results when the target (here called the Hider) does not want to be found. Such problems have been called Search Games (with the "ze- sum" qualifier understood). Book II considers the opposite motive of the target, namely, that he wants to be found. In this case the Searcher and the Hider can be thought of as a team of agents (simply called Player I and Player II) with identical aims, and the coordination problem they jointly face is called the Rendezvous Search Problem.

R3,018

Or split into 4x interest-free payments of 25% on orders over R50
Learn more

Discovery Miles30180
Mobicred@R283pm x 12* Mobicred Info
Free Delivery
Delivery AdviceShips in 10 - 15 working days



Product Description

Search Theory is one of the original disciplines within the field of Operations Research. It deals with the problem faced by a Searcher who wishes to minimize the time required to find a hidden object, or "target. " The Searcher chooses a path in the "search space" and finds the target when he is sufficiently close to it. Traditionally, the target is assumed to have no motives of its own regarding when it is found; it is simply stationary and hidden according to a known distribution (e. g. , oil), or its motion is determined stochastically by known rules (e. g. , a fox in a forest). The problems dealt with in this book assume, on the contrary, that the "target" is an independent player of equal status to the Searcher, who cares about when he is found. We consider two possible motives of the target, and divide the book accordingly. Book I considers the zero-sum game that results when the target (here called the Hider) does not want to be found. Such problems have been called Search Games (with the "ze- sum" qualifier understood). Book II considers the opposite motive of the target, namely, that he wants to be found. In this case the Searcher and the Hider can be thought of as a team of agents (simply called Player I and Player II) with identical aims, and the coordination problem they jointly face is called the Rendezvous Search Problem.

Customer Reviews

No reviews or ratings yet - be the first to create one!

Product Details

General

Imprint

Springer-Verlag New York

Country of origin

United States

Series

International Series in Operations Research & Management Science, 55

Release date

December 2010

Availability

Expected to ship within 10 - 15 working days

First published

2003

Authors

,

Dimensions

235 x 155 x 17mm (L x W x T)

Format

Paperback

Pages

319

Edition

Softcover reprint of the original 1st ed. 2003

ISBN-13

978-1-4419-4908-0

Barcode

9781441949080

Categories

LSN

1-4419-4908-9



Trending On Loot