Building Castles on Sand? Ignoring the Riptide of Information Operations - Maxwell Paper No. 15 (Paperback)

In this compelling study, Lt. Col. Carla D. Bass argues that the American military, underestimating vulnerabilities of the US information infrastructure, has based its strategic policy not on a firm foundation, but rather has built castles on sand. Such documents as "Joint Vision 2010 and United States Air Force Global Engagement" assume the United States will have unimpeded access to information on our own forces and on the enemy's forces as well, due largely to our technological sophistication. They propose application of a downsized US military in a still very deadly world, based on the premise of information superiority. However, the United States will not achieve information superiority until we first attain information assurance by securing our own information systems. Indeed, the defense Science Board cited this point most eloquently in its report delivered to the secretary of defense in November 1996. Lieutenant Colonel Bass believes that the United States simply postulate doctrine and tactics which rely so extensively on information and information technology without comparable attention to information and information systems protection and assurance. As outlined by the Defense Science Board in its "Task Force Information Warfare-Defense," this attention, backed up with sufficient resources, is the only way the Department of Defense can ensure adequate protection of our forces in the face of the inevitable information war. This paper postulates that the information operations (IO) mission should be centralized at the unified command level, specifically Atlantic Command (ACOM), to capture the plethora of uncoordinated, IO-related activities ongoing throughout DOD. Using Special Operations Command (SOCOM) as a model, ACOM would assign teams to combatant commands to help plan and execute information operations missions. ACOM should be allocated a program element (PE) for information operations, paralleling SOCOM's major force program11. This would alleviate a major criticism identified in several national-level studies regarding insufficient, sporadic, and uncoordinated IO expenditures. Establishing an information operations PE would also minimize the conflict with conventionally minded elements of DOD that resist realigning kinetic resources to fund IO initiatives, another problem identified at the national level. Designated as commander in chief for information operations and armed with an information-operation program element, ACOM could lead the way for DO to attain information assurance, thus establishing a firmer foundation for US strategic policy.